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This chapter is concerned with the multiple and contradictory effects of 
state development programmes. Special reference is made to the imple-
mentation of an Integrated Rural Development Programme in the Atlantic 
zone of Costa Rica. It is argued that development intervention entails the 
production, transformation and appropriation of particular models of 
intervention, by which state functionaries conceive of their role as repre-
sentatives of the state and as agents of development. The view is adopted 
that, rather than taking the rhetorics of planned development at face value, 
we have to study in detail how bureaucratic actors deploy discourses of 
intervention in social situations in which differing interests, views and 
commitments are at stake. In so doing, the various ways in which govern-
ment officials devise and deploy views about farmers as lazy and unreli-
able, in short labelling them undeserving, will be analysed and presented. 
It is also argued that labelling is the result of the need of state officials to 
deal with complex situations arising out of the contradictory character of 
state intervention.2 
In developing the argument, reference is made to recent works which 
are highly critical of the role of the state in development programmes, 
highlighting the 'hidden' agendas of state bureaucrats and the instru-
mental role of state intervention in establishing effective modes of social 
control. However, while agreeing with the critical thrust of such works, 
this chapter criticises their implicit assumption that bureaucratic activity 
is underpinned by a specific logic of state penetration or social control. By 
adopting an actor-oriented approach, the analysis centres on how bureau-
cratic actors hold onto ideologies of intervention in order to deal with the 
conflictive and contradictory character of state intervention. It is argued 
that such ideologies are not grand mental schemes or manifestations of 
false consciousness, but rather loose sets of beliefs and practices geared to 
resolving very practical problems in very mundane administrative con-
texts. This dismissal of 'externalist' explanations is important since it 
enables us to tackle the issue of responsibility for the deleterious effects 
that state intervention often has for large groups of beneficiaries. 
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The Critique of Development Intervention 
The practice and discourse of planned development intervention has 
recently been the subject of a thorough demythologization in the fields of 
development sociology and administration. Thus Long and van der Ploeg 
(1989) argue that the discourse of 'development' conceals a number of 
interested practices by administrators and academics which have little to 
do with the theories they put forward. In their view, planned intervention 
should best be viewed as an ongoing process of social construction in 
which bureaucrats, beneficiaries and third parties are involved. Although 
highly critical of the administrative models by means of which develop-
ment programmes and projects are prepared and evaluated, they retain a 
belief in the capacity of social science to improve the practice of develop-
ment intervention. Thus, in the conclusion of their article they argue for 
new kinds of impact studies which take into account the contrasting - and 
often conflicting - interests of the different actors involved.3 
Authors such as Apthorpe (1986), Schaffer (1984,1986) and Wood (1986) 
are highly critical of the role of development intervention in upholding old 
and new modes of political hegemony, and they draw upon post-
structuralist (and, in the case of Wood, perhaps also on Habermasian) 
insights in their concern for how policy languages, techno-administrative 
rationalities and administrative access systems are shaped by alliances 
between bureaucratic systems and scientific knowledge. They argue that 
development intervention is accompanied by forms of labelling which 
stigmatize people - as 'poor,' 'resourceless' and 'dependent' - and 
hence reduce their capacity to engage in local forms of organization. In 
their view, the administrative project model mainly serves to legitimize 
state intervention while concealing the interests of the state in imposing 
a bureaucratic order. Thus, bestowal of an identity as 'clients' on entire 
categories of people obscures the 'hidden agendas' of planned state 
intervention. This is apparent when individuals are forced as 'clients' to 
adopt the discourse of bureaucrats in order to express their needs. The 
science of development administration, then, cannot be viewed as external 
to the problem of 'development' but is itself constitutive of it. It has 
indeed been argued that it has a significant function in depoliticizing the 
relationship between people and the state.4 
Others have gone further in their application of poststructuralist themes 
to development thinking by conceptualizing the power of the development 
bureaucracy in terms of techniques of subjection and 'normalization,' by 
which poor people are transformed into state-subjects and eventually 
transmuted into docile bodies, or passive agents (Escobar 1992; Ferguson 
1990). Such a perspective is, I think, highly suggestive since it teaches us 
to be suspicious about development discourse, with its tendency to make 
invisible what are in fact ways of deploying power invisible. However, my 
view is that the claims of poststructuralist theories are formulated at such 
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a general level that they become an obstacle to detailed analysis of com-
plex social relations between different sets of actors. Here I shall discuss 
critically one example (Ferguson 1990) of such work. 
Ferguson, in his study of a World-Bank funded Integrated Rural Devel-
opment Programme in Lesotho, sets out to demonstrate that deployment 
of current development discourse, produces a particular representation of 
the 'development problematic,' is produced which has nothing to do 
with the 'reality' of Lesotho, and even blatantly contradicts mainstream 
academic discourse. Yet, as he argues, this simplified understanding of the 
'development problematic' is not accidental since it underpins actual 
practices of intervention, as in the case of the IRD Programme he studied. 
Such projects, he argues, have distinctive 'instrument-effects' in practice, 
namely the expansion of state power and the depoliticization of planned 
intervention. 
Ferguson borrows the notion of 'instrument-effect' from Foucault's 
discussion of prison reform to account for the paradox that development 
failures are so readily replicated.5 An 'instrument-effect,' as he defines 
it, is the unintended, yet strategically coherent effect of planned intervention 
which comes about through the deployment of what he calls 'the devel-
opment apparatus.' He concludes that it is not accidental that planned 
intervention so often leads to failure. Indeed, failure is a logical concomi-
tant of planned state intervention, which he graphically depicts as an 
'anti-politics machine.'6 
Despite its conceptual innovativeness, Ferguson's perspective has, in 
my view, serious limitations since it presents us with a basically linear 
model of state intervention It will be argued below that the uncritical 
adoption of poststructuralist views in which state intervention is 
conceptualized in a quasi-conspiratorial way, as the source of all evil, is an 
analytical strategy which adds little to our understanding of the contin-
gencies of localized struggles between bureaucrats and beneficiaries. 
Another point of criticism is that it obscures a number of issues pertaining 
to the issue of responsibility, and thus of agency. 
I elaborate my critique by concentrating on an Integrated Rural Devel-
opment Programme - the 034 Programme - as a case study of a coloniz-
ation and banana plantation area in the Atlantic Zone of Costa Rica. The 
gist of the argument is that, in addition to conceptualizing intervention in 
terms of sets of (discursive) practices of governability geared to converting 
rural people into bureaucratic subjects (the poststructuralist argument), it 
is important to study what intervention comes to mean to different actors 
in particular power contexts. Labelling devices, it is argued, reveal their 
limitations when officials encounter villagers in non-bureaucratic set-
tings.This, in short, implies developing a notion of intervention as ideol-
ogy-
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The 034 Programme 
The Failure of the 034 Programme 
The 034 IRD Programme was designed and funded by the United States 
Agency for International Development, USAID. It was intended to be a 
response by the Costa Rican state to a highly disturbing set of events: the 
invasion by militant leftist peasant unions of a number of large cattle 
ranches - often belonging to the banana plantations - at a time when the 
revolutionary aspirations of radical political sectors were at their height, 
owing to the seizure of state power by the Sandinistas in the neighbouring 
country of Nicaragua. These invasions, which took place in 1978, were the 
last in a series of sometimes very explosive land occupations during the 
'70s. Bananas being Costa Rica's major export commodity, it is not 
surprising that these peasant mobilizations were seen as a threat to the 
economic and political interests of the state, the (foreign) plantation 
owners and the US state department. 
The major goal of the 034 Programme was 'to develop lower cost, more 
effective mechanisms for establishing productive, profitable, and environ-
mentally sound campesino farms on former latifundios.' Its major compo-
nents were 1) the establishment of three model settlements on the 
'invaded' haciendas, and 2) the strengthening of overall administration 
of the Land Development Institute, IDA, through the introduction of a 
computerized data management system and a cadastre. Here I concentrate 
on the first and largest component, the establishment of 'model settle-
ments,' and particularly on the oldest and most conflictive settlement, 
Neguev. It must be stressed, however, that the establishment of settle-
ments was part of a wider, unspoken, goal of rationalizing the workings 
of the Land Development Agency by eradicating clientelistic relations -
and thus politics - from its functioning. 
To cut a long story short, the 034 Programme was a failure. By the time 
it finished in 1987, most settlers/beneficiaries were deeply in debt while 
many others had been compelled to sell their plots. Moreover, only a small 
minority of the farmers could live off their farm while the large majority 
depended on off-farm work (for a detailed description of the programme 
see de Vries 1997). The outcome of the programme was not only disastrous 
for the farmers, but also left an imprint on the way in which administra-
tors and extensionists conceived of the 'agrarian question' in the Atlantic 
Zone, and especially on their views regarding the capacity of settlers to 
become entrepreneurial farmers. Furthermore, the implementation of the 
034 Programme went together with a series of bureaucratic practices by 
which settlers were labelled recalcitrant, uncooperative and opportunistic, 
if not outright lazy and parasitic. 
The way in which the 034 IRD Programme was executed could certainly 
be analyzed in terms of Ferguson's notion of 'instrument-effect," as 
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being geared to 1) the expansion of the state-bureaucracy in order to 
ensure a degree of control over the settler population, and 2) the depolitic-
ization of the relationship between peasants and the state with a view to 
debilitating the role of independent peasant unions. Programme failure in 
this view was simply a financial cost of bringing about these 'instrument 
effects.' 
Ferguson's analysis is, as argued, powerful for its clarity and concise-
ness. It also has strong political and policy implications. Interestingly, it 
coincides with the analysis of radical settlers and peasant leaders who 
argued that the 034 Programme had been intended, from its inception, to 
create a pool of poor and indebted settlers in order to force them to sell 
the land to city speculators. In this way the social basis of independent 
peasant organisations would be disarticulated, while the power of the state 
bureaucracy was strengthened. 
Although there is no doubt that the 034 Programme was directed to 
depoliticizing the relationship between peasants and the state, and that it 
led to an enhancement of the power of the bureaucracy, it is in my view 
simplistic to argue that these were 'unconscious' effects. The issue is not 
only theoretical but has also political importance since it touches on the 
attribution of responsibility concerning the failure of the 034 Programme. 
To begin with, there is, in my view, something wrong in assigning respon-
sibility to some impersonal 'development apparatus.' Blaming some 
abstract 'anti-politics machine' for the marginalization of the settlers 
absolves a number of actors who might, rather consciously indeed, have 
been in favour of such an outcome, and others who did not care very 
much about its consequences. The policymakers, planners and front-line 
workers involved in the design and execution of the programme were not 
naive since they were aware of the political character of intervention, and 
the necessity to control a 'difficult' social situation. Failure did not occur 
beyond the powers of human agency. As Schaff er (1984) argues, there is 
nothing inevitable in policy. Things could have happened differently. 
Second, blaming the 'anti-politics machine' for the failures of state 
intervention unnecessarily reduces the options of peasant organisations to 
two possible alternatives: that of engaging in political action against the 
state by forming organisations ready to confront it; and that of submitting 
to it. This, in fact, is not the political strategy that radical peasant unions 
in the Atlantic zone follow, as they are always ready to negotiate with 
some state agencies while attacking others. The radicalism of peasant 
unions had its limits, and for good reasons. State intervention through the 
034 Programme had been massive and highly repressive and the peasant 
union which organized the invasion, UP AGRA (the union of Small Pro-
ducers of the Atlantic zone), came to the conclusion that confronting the 
state head-on was too painful. As a result UP AGRA changed its strategy 
and decided to spend much effort on establishing connections with nation-
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al and international NGOs as well as with some state agencies. There was 
some room for manoeuvre left, indeed. 
Concerning the issue of attribution of responsibility for the failure of the 
034 Programme, it must be noted that other explanations were offered, 
both by the settlers and the bureaucracy. Some settlers, who had been able 
to establish a preferential relationship with the state, were ready to share 
the responsibility with the bureaucrats dismissing the radicals' arguments 
as communist propaganda. In defense of the bureaucrats, the following 
arguments could be put forward. Technical errors were made in the 
process of implementation; there was a lack of training of the extensionists; 
there was little knowledge of agronomic and economic conditions; the 
programme managers were pressed to spend the funds in a short period 
of time; there was major opposition to the Programme from conservative 
sections at the Land Development Agency. However, these contingencies 
do not absolve those who were in charge, for the simple reason that even 
when they knew that the programme was heading for disaster they did 
not take steps to stop it. In the case of the policymakers not only were 
their reputations at stake, since they also saw the Programme as a stepping 
stone in their professional careers. The 034 Programme, in becoming an 
arena of struggle between different institutional factions, acquired an 
importance that was far removed from the objects of development, the 
settlers. Furthermore, those responsible for the programme did not want 
to partake in failure and, indeed, those in charge never admitted that it 
was a failure. As evidence for this viewpoint, they adduced that it had had 
positive 'learning' effects. It is not surprising, then, that critical evalu-
ations concerning credit recovery and production levels were concealed or 
even destroyed. 
The issue of attribution of responsibility is, I think, important. Not 
because it might change the behaviour of bureaucrats, since I think that 
they had strong reasons for acting as they did, but because it might help 
us to identify a series of beliefs and practices underpinning state interven-
tion, which might have very deleterious effects for peasants. Thus, instead 
of viewing bureaucratic actors as determined by external forces, I am 
intent on inquiring how they shape, adapt and transform particular admin-
istrative models with a view to making them fit their own socio-institu-
tional activities and commitments. I call such a set of beliefs and practices 
an ideology of intervention. 
But before continuing I want to add a caveat. Ideology is not used here 
in the sense of 'false consciousness.' Yet it is conceptualized in terms of 
an illusion which makes it possible for us to accomplish a multitude of 
mundane activities. In other words, 'knowing' that our actions do not 
correspond with our ideals does not necessarily stop us from continuing 
to engage in the same kinds of social practices. We may come to the 
conclusion that our views are false, but it is much more difficult to dis-
cover what is false in our practices, since this requires that we should 
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recognize that these are structured by ideology. Or, as Eagleton (1991) 
drawing upon Zizek (1989) puts it, 
'One traditional form of ideology critique assumes that social practices 
are real, but that the beliefs used to justify them are false or illusory. 
But this opposition . . . can be reversed. For if ideology is illusion, then 
it is an illusion which structures our social practices; and to this extent 
'falsity' lies on the side of what we do, not necessarily of what we 
say. Ideology, in other words, is not just a matter of what I think about 
a situation; it is somehow inscribed in that situation itself' (p. 40). 
This was exactly the paradox of the large majority of policymakers, admin-
istrators and front-line workers involved in the 034 Programme. Although 
they knew that their actions contradicted a number of views which were 
dear to them, such as that of improving the lot of poor peasants, they 
continued drawing upon the same ideological beliefs and practices by 
which a great diversity of farmers with different backgrounds, aspirations 
and commitments were labelled traditional, dependent and incompetent. 
Intervention was not ideological because the bureaucrats were unable to 
distinguish between the truth and the falsity of the discourses they 
deployed, but rather because it structured their intervention practices. 
Next, I want to analyse the ideological fantasy which structured these 
practices. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, the adminis-
trative context wherein practices of labelling are sustained is examined. 
Second, the genealogy of a particular model of the ideal farmer - as a 
client who has the right to state services and goods in return for his 
commitment to, and active participation in his transformation into an 
entrepreneurial farmer - is presented. It is shown that this model stems 
from Programme planners' attempts to depoliticize institution-client 
relations. Finally, it is argued that the model is transformed by front-line 
workers into a protective device for dealing with unruly beneficiaries. 
The Local and Administrative Context 
Neguev, before becoming a settlement, was a hacienda devoted mainly to 
beef cattle breeding and fattening, and was of the largest ranches in the 
Atlantic zone. The hacienda was invaded in 1978, and a year later 
UP AGRA and the IDA reached an agreement to purchase the hacienda. In 
1980, when the 034 Programme started, the IDA's presence became 
widespread all over the settlement. The IDA'S intervention was massive 
and, as argued, was directed towards converting the settlement into a 
demonstration project. 
The Neguev administrative office is located in the Neguev settlement 
which comprises a total area of 5,340 ha Later, in 1987, it became a 
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regional office covering five settlements with a total area of 12,724 ha and 
1,294 settlers. 
Activities in the administrative office basically consisted in the follow-
ing: 1) promotion of agricultural development via the supply of credit and 
the provision of extension, and 2) achievement of effective control in the 
settlement through the regulation of access to land. This, it must be noted, 
was a generally accepted, though not openly admitted objective of the 034 
Programme. It was never explicitly stated in IDA or 034 Programme 
documents. However the IDA's and USAID policy makers made no secret 
of the fact that the Programme was also directed to the normalization of 
social relations between squatters and the state in conflictive areas such as 
Neguev. 
For reasons which I cannot explain here but which had much to do with 
the contradictions of state intervention at the local level, the administrative 
process in the Neguev office was characterized by little work motivation.7 
Work activities were little structured and front-line workers were allowed 
considerable freedom to carry out their tasks as they liked. This resulted 
in a situation characterized by few work incentives and no reward system. 
Accordingly, one recurrent field of dissatisfaction in the Neguev office 
concerned what was perceived as 'the arbitrary character of policy.' As 
one extensionist put it, 
'at Neguev there is no stimulus. If you get promoted it is because of 
your political connections, not because of your capabilities. Successes at 
the technical level are always claimed by the chief. For example, when 
presentations have to be made about the goals achieved by the adminis-
trative office it is always the chief who does it. There is anyway no 
acknowledgement of your role.' 
Yet this provided the context within which a large number of important 
decisions were taken, including who would and who would not receive 
credit and how problems over land-adjudication would be resolved. The 
way such decisions were taken appears to have been quite arbitrary since 
there were no clear criteria, for example, for allocating credit. What is 
interesting, then, is that issues of service delivery were dealt with within 
an administrative context of generalized distrust. It is not surprising that 
front-line workers showed little inclination to reflect on the reasons why 
the 034 Programme resulted in increased poverty among the settler popu-
lation. In fact, when discussing problems of individual settlers, they drew 
upon an impersonal and bureaucratic language by which the settlers were 
transformed in administrative cases. In this way front-line workers were 
insulated from the contradictory and contingent character of state interven-
tion. 
Indeed, it struck me when talking with front-line workers that reference 
was always made to a particular, very negative, set of views of the farmer: 
he was seen as an individual who was not commercially minded, not 
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entrepreneurial, and incapable of running a farm. Indeed, in spite of their 
divergences and dissatisfactions, and the feeling that their work was not 
much valued, they all shared this way of talking about the beneficiary 
when dealing with everyday service delivery issues, in what was basically 
a form of labelling. 
Next, I contend that labelling was not a local invention, but that it was 
a local adaptation of the USAID planners' model of the 'client' by front-
line workers and administrators. To that end I shall describe how the 
model of the 'client' was fabricated by USAID planners as a result of 
their problematization of prevailing institution-client relations in the IDA, 
and how it was appropriated by bureaucrats at regional and local levels. 
The Genealogy of the Model of the 'Client' 
As already argued, one of the two components of the 034 Programme was 
the strengthening of the operational capacity of the IDA. The USAID 
advisor to the 034 Programme argued that political clientelism was a 
fundamental problem in Costa Rica since it generated patterns of transac-
tions between politicians who used state institutions in order to obtain 
electoral support from groups of beneficiaries. In his view, the political use 
of institutional resources thwarted their effective utilization for develop-
ment purposes. This emphasis on institutional efficiency and administra-
tive reform, it must be noted, was coupled with the view by USAID 
planners that some mode of social control in rural areas, directed against 
organisations such as UP AGRA, was required. 
In a context of increasing land scarcity and budgetary constraints in the 
IDA, the agrarian problematic came increasingly to be perceived, under 
the influence of USAID, as a problem of effective institutional intervention, 
in which administrative reform was viewed as central to a 'modern' 
approach to land reform. This entailed that the solution to the problem of 
landlessness and rural unrest was conceived by the USAID programme 
designers in terms of the 'depoliticization' of institutional developmental 
activities, rather than in terms of the need to accommodate oppositional 
political groupings within the mainstream political system. 
It is not surprising, then, that the agrarian problem in Costa Rica was 
conceptualized in 034 Programme documents in terms of the effectivity of 
particular types of institution-client relations. Thus it is argued that in' the 
past IDA-client relations were permeated by 'paternalist and clientelist 
practices.' We see, in effect, that the farmer is referred to as a 'client' in 
the project document of the 034 Programme which, prior to the 034 Pro-
gramme, had not been the case. We also see that the term 'client' 
appears in different forms: when a classification of the clientele is made, 
a description of the 'total client pool' is given, or when reference is made 
to particular types of institution-client relationships. Paternalism is men-
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tioned as a danger which has to be combatted through the 'rational choice 
of a clientele.'8 
The problem, then, was conceptualized by USAID planners as that of 
how to establish a type of institution-client relationship which would 
eschew the customary patterns of political clientelism while maintaining 
a certain capacity to exert social control on particular populations, such as 
politically motivated squatters. The answer was to institute a mode of 
institution-client relations in which the beneficiary was viewed as an 
individual with certain rights, but also with distinctive obligations towards 
the state. In contrast to the practice of political clientelism, these rights and 
obligations did not entail a political transaction, but a commitment to a 
particular pattern of smallholder 'development.' Thus central to this 
model of the 'client' was the conferment of a distinctive institutional, as 
against a political, significance on the relationship between the institution 
and the beneficiary. The client was treated as an individual who had the 
right to state services and goods in return for his commitment to, and 
active participation in his own transformation into an entrepreneurial 
farmer. 
The essence of the model of the 'client' was that s /he established a 
relationship with the IDA as an individual, not as a member of a larger 
group. This was a very different policy for the IDA from the previous one 
of engaging in negotiations with organised pressure groups. Hence, by 
allocating resources such as credit to individuals only, and refusing to 
engage in negotiations with groups, the power Of organisations such as 
UPAGRA was undermined. 
As for the 034IRD Programme, the individualization of the relationship 
between the IDA and its clients was reflected in the following sets of 
activities. 
1 A beneficiary selection system geared to choosing potentially entrepre-
neurial farmers. 
2 A system of guided extension by which the beneficiary received credit 
on an individual basis. 
3 A focus on individual farm development plans. 
In effect, through these individualization practices all kinds of negotiations 
with independent peasant organizations could be avoided. 
In the remainder of the chapter, I argue that this model of the 'client' 
worked out in a rather special way during the process of implementation. 
The model was endowed with a different, 'local' meaning by front-line 
workers and administrators, with the result that it became an element in 
a local ideology of intervention. The view of the 'undeserving client' 
was, in effect, employed by the Settlement Head in order to force settlers 
to comply with the IDA policy. For front-line workers, the view of the 
'undeserving client' became a tool for explaining the contradictions of 
state intervention as well as a 'labelling device.' The transformed view 
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of the ' (undeserving) client,' then, became an instrument of social control 
at the local level. 
The Ten Commandments of the 'Real Entrepreneurial Farmer' 
The model of the client reflected the various ways in which front line 
workers differentiated between good and bad farmers. The independent, 
entrepreneurial yeoman of the central plateau came to funcion in practice 
as a standard measure. Deviations from this model were seen as pathologi-
cal and originating in a deleterious way of life. Thus, it became common 
to explain the problems of the 034 Programme in the settlement by argu-
ing that alcoholism, lack of commitment and indiscipline were major 
problems among settlers. Extensive conversations with front-line workers 
about how an entrepreneurial farmer should be, enabled me to discern the 
following rules:9 
• He should live on the farm, and not engage in off-farm work outside 
Neguev. 
He should not grow traditional crops such as maize. 
He should show the devotion and commitment of a 'real farmer.' 
He should show respect for IDA officials. 
He should follow the advice of the extension staff. 
He should be imaginative and able to improvise. 
He should not be an ex-plantation worker. 
He should not drink. 
He should not participate in activities organised by leftist groups. 
He should not be an evangelical (because evangelicals spend too much 
time in church). 
These ten 'commandments,' to be followed in order to conform to front-
line workers' views of what a 'real' entrepreneurial farmer was, in fact 
composed a powerful labelling device. Given the failure of agricultural 
development programmes in Neguev, and the fact that no more than 10 
percent of the farmers were able to derive a sufficient income from their 
farms without engaging in off-farm work on some banana plantation or 
other farm, it was quite impossible for farmers to conform to the model. 
Moreover, the only three settler families in Neguev who did conform to 
this model according to the front-line workers, and who could thus be 
considered real entrepreneurial farmers, had never received IDA credit or 
extension.10 On the other hand, those settlers who were viewed as the best 
in Neguev did not conform to this model either; of the three, one was an 
ex-plantation worker, one an occasional alcoholic, and the third a Jeho-
vah's Witness. 
Ironically, the integrated rural development programme had, instead of 
creating wealthy smallholders, created a pool of poor, indebted and 
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dependent clients. Settlers, then, were labelled, virtually by definition, non-
entrepreneurial or traditional farmers; and in this way they got the blame 
for the failure of the 034 Programme. But labelling also had a more practi-
cal function as it became a device for excluding 'troublesome' settlers or 
problemâticos. Indeed, labelling a settler as a problemdtico signified that it 
would be difficult for him to gain access to credit. 
The Model of the Client Transformed into a Labelling Device 
The question to be addressed now is 'how is this mode of labelling 
related to the model of the 'client' which was introduced by US AID'? 
This latter model, which was employed by top level officials and pro-
gramme designers, conceived of the settler/beneficiary as a client who had 
to be provided with the necessary conditions - land, credit and an appro-
priate technological package - to become an entrepreneurial farmer. As 
argued below, this model became transformed at the level of implementa-
tion into a labelling device through which the client was viewed as 
undeserving. Thus, the model of the 'client,' which was originally meant 
to depoliticize institution-client relations, became an instrument in the 
hands of the local administrators for fighting 'undeserving clients.' And 
since, as we have argued, most farmers were seen in one way or another 
as troublesome - since they did not conform to the ten commandments of 
the ideal farmer - the view of the 'undeserving client,' became a central 
element within the local official's discourse and imagery. 
As we noted, the 034 Programme had two main goals: that of providing 
settlers with the necessary conditions for becoming commercially minded 
and that of overcoming what was perceived as a politically delicate situ-
ation in Neguev. Indeed, it can be argued that one of the 034 Pro-
gramme's major contradiction lay in the fact that it was designed to 
confront a very conflictive situation in the Atlantic zone, by combining a 
policy of careful beneficiary selection with an approach geared to trans-
forming settlers into entrepreneurial farmers, in order to fight the influence 
of leftist organisations such as UPAGRA. At the same time, a large num-
ber of UPAGRA sympathisers passed the beneficiary selection system. This 
produced a major problem for front-line administrators, which can be 
formulated as follows: 'how could unruly clients, such as UPAGRA 
followers, be transformed into entrepreneurial farmers'? We will see next 
that the Settlement Head viewed this as a contradiction in terms. 
The Model of the Client as Transformed by the Settlement Head 
The Settlement Head had a distinctive theory of how a peasant should 
look. This conception of the beneficiary was not unique to him, though, 
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and I later learned that it was quite characteristic for many administrators 
in the area. He once confided to me: 
'If you want to tell a real farmer from someone who is not, look 
straight into his eyes. A farmer will lower his sight, and become shy, for 
he is not accustomed to dealing with people from the city; they are 
humble and speak with respect. A banana worker is something else, 
direct in his conduct, insolent. That is the result of the plantation culture 
and the ideology of the unions, which always stresses the negative 
aspects of everything.' 
According to the Settlement Head, union leaders on the plantations would 
tell the plantation workers that they were poor because others were rich, 
that they were stupid because others were intelligent, and that they were 
ugly because others were beautiful. In his view plantation workers devel-
oped an inferiority complex which expressed itself through envy. And he 
warned me: 
'If you meet them they will try to mislead you and tell you stories 
about their extreme poverty. But the truth is that they are ex-banana 
workers, people who cannot manage a farm autonomously. They are 
accustomed to receiving everything from the boss, a cheque every 
month, a house with water and electricity. They dress well and drink 
and do terrible things to their wives and children. It is really awful. In 
return they work a few hours, from 6 to 11 in the morning. They have 
a lot of free time. They become conceited, rebellious, have no respect for 
authority. Instead a real farmer works the entire day. And if necessary 
also at night. If the cow is sick he will not sleep at all.' 
This 'cultural problem' had played a central role in the 034 Programme, 
according to the Settlement Head. He commented that the squatters had 
received beautiful schools and meeting centres, excellent roads, even a 
housing programme had been initiated. Yet they had never shown any 
gratitude. Hence he complained that 'unfortunately that is the human 
material we have to work with in the settlements.' At the same time, he 
had a clear theory, with a strong social Darwinist bent, of a settlement's 
growth and development in terms of stages,. Once he explained to me: 
'You see in Neguev, like in so many other settlements, that after the 
political situation has been normalized, a mechanism of natural selection 
sets in. Settlers who are not real farmers are forced to sell out because 
they accumulate debts. Although they receive credit and extension, 
many of them, maybe a majority, do not have the ability to develop the 
enterprise. So they are forced to sell out. Others take their place, often 
people with more resources. They are obliged to take on the debts their 
predecessors incurred. So they are better motivated to develop the farm. 
In fact they have a more entrepreneurial outlook. The result is that after 
some years a majority of the original population will have disappeared. 
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Only then will the conditions for achieving the objectives of the institu-
tion be fulfilled. This process is irreversible, it is a law of nature. The 
only thing we can do is to alleviate the lot of those who suffer most.' 
According to the Settlement Head, the problem was that peasant unions 
such as UPAGRA targeted particular type of individual who, due to his 
plantation mentality, was unable to become an entrepreneurial farmer and 
therefore prone to enter into clientelistic relationships with radical 
organisations and eventually with the IDA. The question of 'how to 
transform unruly clients into model beneficiaries' was viewed by him as 
a contradiction in terms. Such 'human material' was not fit to become 
entrepreneurial farmers. In fact, we see in the case of the Settlement Head 
that he sustained a genetic conception of the farmer which, it must be 
emphasized, was not shared by front-line workers. 
The upshot, then, was that for the Settlement Head the model of the 
'client' was transformed into a core element in an ideology of interven-
tion which was meant to confront 'unruly clients.' In effect, the model 
of the 'client' was transformed by front-line administrators from a device 
for depolitizicing institution-client relations into an essentially political 
instrument for marginalizing 'troublesome' beneficiaries. 
Next, I want to show that the view of the 'undeserving client' was 
more than a cognitive construct intended to marginalize radical settlers. 
My argument is that this view was part of an ideology of intervention 
which also included practices of labelling. It is expedient now to provide 
a definition of what I understand by an ideology of intervention. 
An ideology of intervention can be seen as an action-oriented set of 
beliefs associated with specific practices of social control (labelling, 
legitimization), rather than as a coherent normative framework. Ideologies 
are pragmatic insofar as they serve to shape an understanding of the 
world: that is useful within particular social contexts, in the case of front-
line workers, that of implementation. An ideology of intervention is not 
so much false in that it obscures the complex reality of the farmer, but is 
rather an interested simplification of the conflictive nature of state inter-
vention. That becomes clear to the front-line worker him/herself when 
confronted with the contradictions of implementation, compelling him/her 
to develop an operational style for dealing with conflicting social and 
moral commitments. The force of the ideology of intervention, then, is that 
it is able to produce useful interpretations for the ongoing problems of 
implementation, as well as practical ways to handle them, without being 
able to mask the power relations underlying such problems. 
Next I discuss the workings of this ideology of intervention as manifest 
in the front-line workers' dealings with beneficiaries' within the adminis-
trative domain. 
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The Model of the 'Client ' as Transformed by the Técnicos 
The 'client' model played an important 'protective,' role with respect 
to radical leftist settlers. It should be noted that interaction between 
officials and radical settlers was rare and, when it did take place, was for 
the most part in the fields. Indeed, the técnicos or extensionists in charge 
of agricultural development programmes had evident difficulties in 
coming to terms with the peasant union UPAGRA, and displayed a 
curious ambiguity toward them. 
The técnicos would stress that they respected and even admired the role 
of UPAGRA as a peasant union in its efforts to defend farmers' interests, 
and that they found it totally legitimate and even necessary that such an 
organization existed, although they recognized that the IDA's interests 
were not necessarily those of the settlers. At the same time, they argued 
that they did not agree with UPAGRA's means and intransigent position, 
indeed, they were highly critical of their mode of operation. As one 
extensionist put it: 
'UPAGRA has its own ways of dealing with técnicos. When you visit 
them they receive you in a very polite manner, and by telling you a lot 
about themselves they try to get information out of you. They are aware 
that you might write a bad report on them. However, they do not seem 
to mind. When they attend meetings they are surprisingly friendly, 
while seeking ways to critizice all the institute's ideas. They hope that 
the official will lose his temper in order to create a conflict, so that they 
can transform the character of the meeting into one of a tribunal against 
the institute.' 
They were remarkably negative when referring to individual activists. 
Thus they would account for the 'negative attitudes' of the UPAGRA 
leaders by referring to personality failures, like drinking habits and smok-
ing marijuana. This view of UPAGRA leaders and sympathizers as irre-
sponsible settlers was general among the técnicos. Settlers who indulged 
in collective actions like marches and blockades could not be good 
farmers: they were almost never at their farms, and thus there was little 
sense in visiting them. UPAGRA, in their view, channelled the feelings of 
frustration and dissatisfaction of settlers arising from their personal inabil-
ities. The extensionists, then, would select unproblematic settlers and not 
UPAGRA followers. 
It must be stressed that this fear of UPAGRA on the part of most 
técnicos was not so much a political stance as a result of an attempt to keep 
delicate political issues out of their direct relationship with settlers. The 
técnicos were perfectly able to consider general explanations of settlers' 
life conditions in terms of a wider political framework. Yet, these explana-
tions were of little use within the implementation context. Although 
officials would, outside the administrative domain, readily recognize the 
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general validity of 'radical' claims, such views were experienced as 
annoying within the day-to-day context of service delivery. 
Summary and Conclusions 
It has been shown how a model of the 'client' - or the model of the 
farmer as a client who has to be serviced and provided with a package in 
order to encourage him to become an entrepreneurial farmer - was used 
by different groups of actors in differing ways. For USAID it was an 
element in a strategy of depolitizicing the functioning of the IDA and 
eradicating client and paternalistic politics. The model of the 'client' was 
used by front-line administrators for combating the influence of leftist 
organisations such as UP AGRA. And finally, when the programme proved 
to be a disaster, this view of the 'undeserving client' served as a 'ration-
alization' for failure, and a way of shifting the blame onto the farmer. 
The model of the client, then, changes from being a core element of an 
attempt by planners to change the current pattern of client-institution 
relations into an element of an intervention ideology serving to conceal the 
contradictory and conflictive character of state intervention, which was 
reflected in major errors made in design and implementation, and the 
impossibility of denying the political character of state intervention in a 
plantation area such as the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica, where resources 
such as land and capital are monopolized by the banana transnationals 
and state intervention serves as an instrument for social control. 
Thus the failure of the 034 Programme was ascribed to the fact that the 
settlers were not entrepreneurial farmers. In this way, it was unnecessary 
to inquire into the major errors in programme planning, implementation 
and technology transfer. 
It has also been argued that the administrative process consisted of an 
intrinsically fragmented and conflictive reality in which a host of petty 
struggles took place. Yet it is important to stress that it is precisely within 
this administrative reality, and in response to the daily problems and 
conflicts in which front-line workers are engaged, that an intervention 
ideology is sustained. 
It is important to emphasize that the ideology of intervention was not 
imposed from the top upon the thinking of the front-line workers and 
administrators responsible for programme implementation. It did, how-
ever, bring together different worlds of experience and forms of socio-
political commitment: of front-line workers, administrators and institu-
tional managers. In effect, it provided various actors operating within 
institutional worlds a common language for talking about and assessing 
intervention problems. 
An ideology of intervention, then, is not false in the sense that it clouds 
the thinking of the actors drawing upon it. It derives its power from its 
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usefulness for accomplishing particular bureaucratic tasks, even when the 
actors themselves are constantly confronted with the fact that they are 
simplifications, if not caricatures, of a more complex reality.11 
It has also been argued that the ideology of intervention in Neguev 
encompassed a particular view of the '(undeserving) client,' and prac-
tices of labelling. The world of the 'clients,' amongst other things, was 
kept apart from that of administrative life, through the intervention 
ideology. This was because settlers were seen as clients who had to be 
serviced, and not as individuals who often shared the same local preoccu-
pations as the officials. But the ideology of intervention was also instru-
mental in achieving quite practical effects, such as protecting front-line 
workers from 'troublesome' settlers. It also served as a guide for select-
ing cooperative beneficiaries. We can, then, identify five different ways in 
which the ideology of intervention worked: 
1 In achieving a neat separation between the administrative and the field 
domains. In this way front-line workers were insulated from the con-
flicts in the 'field.' 
2 In concealing the contradictions of state intervention by providing easy 
explanations for current and ongoing problems concerning programme 
implementation. 
3 As a way of rationalizing programme failure. Thus it was argued that 
the 034 Programme failed because of the lack of an entrepreneurial 
mentality on the part of the settlers. Major factors in the programme 
failure, such as errors during implementation and the use of credit as 
an instrument of social control, were concealed. 
4 As a way of protecting front-line workers from 'troublesome' settlers, 
such as Upagristas who were out to politicize what the front-line 
workers viewed as 'technical issues.' 
5 As a way of selecting 'cooperative beneficiaries.' 
A final conclusion is that conceptualizing state activity in terms of bureau-
cratic logic may obscure the issue of responsibility. This chapter has 
pinpointed the ideological illusions by which bureaucratic actors deceive 
themselves when carrying out their duties which, though contradicting 
their views, are instrumental for carrying out very mundane tasks. Paying 
attention to these ideological fantasies points to the fact that development 
intervention is, by definition, a contested domain of activity. In other 
words, it is an ongoing process of social construction. 
Notes 
1 This is a slightly revised version of a paper published in The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, number 36, 1996, Special Issue. 
2 In other articles (de Vries 1992b, 1995) emphasis is placed on the strategies farmers 
develop in order to delegitimize the discourses of state intervention. 
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3 A number of recent articles argue that everyday encounters between bureaucrats and 
villagers play a significant role in shaping popular representations and notions of corrup-
tion, and of people's rights and obligations (Gupta 1995; Orlove 1991; for a theoretical 
rationale for such an approach from an actor-oriented perspective, see Long 1989). 
4 Thus Schaffer (1986) argues that scarcities are constructed through discourses of develop-
ment along with social practices of administration, and that they lead to a specific mode 
of social control and legitimacy. 
5 As Ferguson puts it, Foucault (1979) argues that the instrument-effect of the prison, as a 
correctional institution, lies in the fact that it does not lead to the rehabilitation of trans-
gressors but, on the contrary, to the constitution of delinquency as a mode of subjectivity 
disconnected from its social origins. Prison reform, then, appears to be an element within 
a set of techniques of exercising social control, a part of a strategy for 'taming 'popular 
illegalities' and transforming the political fact of illegality into the quasi-medical one of 
pathological 'delinquency" (p. 19). 
6 Thus he argues, '. . . because 'failed' development projects can so successfully help to 
accomplish important tasks behind the backs of the most sincere participants, it does 
become less mysterious why 'failed' development projects should end up being 
replicated again and again. It is perhaps reasonable to suggest that it may even be because 
development projects turn out to have such uses, even if they are in some sense unfore-
seen, that they continue to attract so much interest and support' (p. 256). 
7 For lack of space I cannot go into the institutional struggles which had a marked effect on 
the administrative process in Neguev and which led to a sharp division among the front-
line workers along ethnic, residential and functional lines. Elsewhere (de Vries 1997) I 
argue that these divisions were an expression of the contradictions of state intervention 
at the level of implementation. 
8 This 'project paper' was published in 1980 as an unclassified document. It provides a 
description and appraisal of the project as well as detailed project analyses (see project 
paper 'Agrarian Settlement and Productivity in the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica). 
9 A female in the front-line workers' view was not capable of running a farm. Women 
who did not have grown-up sons who could take care of the farm had difficulties 
obtaining title to land. 
10 I do not want to go into the analysis of why the programme ended a failure. It suffices 
to mention that to a large extent the soils in Neguev were not suited for agriculture. In 
addition major errors were made concerning extension and technology transfer. 
11 As Zizek (1989) puts it, 'the illusion of [ideology] is not on the side of knowledge, it is 
already on the side of reality itself, of what the people are doing. What they do not know 
is that their social reality itself, their activity, is guided by an illusion, by a fetishistic 
inversion. What they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but the illusion 
which is structuring their reality, their real social activity. They know very well how 
things really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know' (p. 32). 'The 
fundamental level of ideology, [then], is not of an illusion masking the real state of things 
but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself' (p. 33). In fact, 
what I have designated the ideology of intervention functions as Zizek's ideological 
fantasy. 
